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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-4498 
___________ 
 
ANDRE ANTHONY DACRES, 
        Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED 
 STATES OF AMERICA,  
                                                Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A042-255-866) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Andrew R. Arthur 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 12, 2015 
 
Before: AMBRO, VANASKIE and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 16, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Andre Dacres petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) 
final order of removal.  We will dismiss the petition in part and deny it in part. 
I. 
 Dacres, a 30-year-old native and citizen of Jamaica, entered the United States as a 
lawful permanent resident in 1989.  In 2011, a Pennsylvania state court convicted him of 
manufacturing, delivering, or possessing with intent to manufacture or deliver heroin, in 
violation of 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(a)(30).  Dacres was sentenced to a minimum 
prison term of 11 months and 15 days, and a maximum prison term of 23 months.   
 In light of that conviction, the Department of Homeland Security charged Dacres 
with being removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony, see 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and a controlled substance offense, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  
Dacres, through counsel, appeared before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and denied the 
charges of removability.  The IJ ultimately sustained those charges and Dacres applied 
for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  In 
support of his application, Dacres alleged that he feared harm at the hands of the Shower 
Posse (a gang in Jamaica that, according to Dacres, was affiliated with the Jamaican 
government) and enemies of his father, who had been a Shower Posse member. 
 In March 2014, after holding a merits hearing, the IJ denied the application.  The 
IJ concluded that Dacres’s crime constituted a “particularly serious crime” under  
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii), thereby rendering Dacres ineligible for withholding of 
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removal.  After reviewing the record evidence at length, (see A.R. at 164-69), the IJ also 
concluded that Dacres’s CAT claim failed on the merits. 
 In addressing Dacres’s CAT claim, the IJ explained that, while there remained 
significant violence and corruption in Jamaica, Dacres had failed to show that any harm 
he might face in Jamaica at the hands of the Shower Posse and/or his father’s enemies 
would be “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of or 
with the willful blindness of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity.”  (Id. at 169.)  The IJ found, inter alia, that the Jamaican government had made 
reforms to address “corruption and collusion between police officers and criminals in that 
country.”  (Id. at 166.)  The IJ also highlighted the “significant efforts that the 
government of Jamaica exerted against [the Shower Posse] in May of 2010,” id. at 169, 
and determined that  
any harm inflicted on [Dacres] by a corrupt police officer 
working at the behest of a criminal organization would be the 
action of an isolated rogue agent engaging in extra-judicial 
acts of brutality, which are not only a contravention of 
Jamaica’s laws and policies, but are committed despite 
authorities’ best efforts to root out such misconduct and 
therefore not torturous as that term is defined in the 
regulations o[r] case law. 
 
(Id.)     
 Dacres, still represented by counsel, appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA.  In 
October 2014, the BIA dismissed the appeal, concluding that Dacres’s various arguments 
lacked merit.  Among other things, the BIA rejected Dacres’s challenge to the denial of 
4 
 
his CAT claim, concluding that there was no reason to disturb the IJ’s determination that 
Dacres “did not demonstrate that it is more likely than not that he would suffer abuse 
amounting to torture, within the meaning of 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18, by or with the consent or 
acquiescence of public officials acting in their official capacity, if he were removed to 
Jamaica.”  (Id. at 5.) 
 Dacres, now proceeding pro se, seeks our review of the agency’s decision. 
II. 
 We generally have jurisdiction to review final orders of removal.  See 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1252(a)(1).  But where, as here, the alien is found to be removable for having been 
convicted of an aggravated felony and a controlled substance offense, our jurisdiction is 
limited to reviewing constitutional claims and questions of law.  See 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1252(a)(2)(C)-(D); Borrome v. Att’y Gen., 687 F.3d 150, 154 (3d Cir. 2012).  We 
review such claims and questions under a de novo standard.  See Mudric v. Att’y Gen., 
469 F.3d 94, 97 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 Dacres’s first claim appears to contend that the IJ’s decision is inconsistent with a 
2013 decision issued by the Immigration Court in Cleveland, Ohio.1  In that case, an alien 
apparently was granted CAT relief based on his claim that he feared harm at the hands of 
the Shower Posse.  Dacres attempted to rely on that case in his appeal, but the BIA 
                                              
1 The administrative record here contains only a news article about the Cleveland case.  
The article, published by the University of Chicago Law School, briefly describes the 
case but does not identify the name of the alien.    
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concluded that there was no reason to disturb the IJ’s denial of CAT relief in his case. 
 Although a fear of the Shower Posse was at issue in both cases, Dacres has not 
shown (or even attempted to show) that the two cases are materially similar.  If anything, 
it appears that the alien’s CAT claim in the Cleveland case was much stronger than 
Dacres’s claim.  Whereas Dacres left Jamaica as a young child more than 25 years ago, it 
appears that the alien in the Cleveland case had been captured by the Shower Posse in 
Jamaica in 2003 and narrowly escaped being executed by that group before fleeing to the 
United States.  Accordingly, Dacres cannot show that the agency committed legal error 
by not granting him relief based on the Cleveland case.   
 Dacres’s second claim is that the IJ did not make a complete record of Dacres’s 
merits hearing.  During the hearing, the testimony of Dacres’s sister was inadvertently 
not tape recorded.  Upon realizing the error, the IJ recounted the sister’s testimony on the 
record.  Dacres’s counsel stated that this recounting was “perfect” except for the issue of 
whether there was a conflict in the sister’s testimony regarding the date of a particular 
event.  The IJ then stated that he would give the sister the benefit of the doubt and find 
that there was no contradiction. 
 Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1240.9, the hearing before the IJ “shall be recorded 
verbatim.”  Although that did not happen here, “a mere failure of transcription, by itself, 
does not rise to a due process violation.”  Garza-Moreno v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 239, 241 
(6th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted); Kheireddine v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 80, 85 (1st 
Cir. 2005) (same); see McLeod v. INS, 802 F.2d 89, 95 (3d Cir. 1986) (concluding that 
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transcription errors in the petitioner’s case did not warrant relief because those errors did 
not “come at a critical juncture in the transcript” and petitioner “had a fair review of his 
claims for relief from deportation”).  The BIA concluded that Dacres did not show that he 
was prejudiced by the transcription error, and he has done nothing to call that conclusion 
into question. 
 Dacres next claims that he should have been granted CAT relief.  To the extent 
that he takes issue with the agency’s factual findings, that aspect of his argument is 
outside the scope of our review and must be dismissed.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)-
(D).  On the other hand, to the extent that his argument could be construed as challenging 
the agency’s application of law to the undisputed facts of his CAT claim, we have 
jurisdiction over that argument.  See Singh v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 533, 541 (3d Cir. 
2006).  Nevertheless, Dacres has not demonstrated that the BIA erred in upholding the 
denial of CAT relief.  Contrary to his assertions, we are not persuaded that the IJ failed to 
consider certain evidence or “adequately implement” the willful blindness standard 
governing CAT claims. 
 Lastly, Dacres argues that the IJ erred by failing to grant his motion for a 
continuance that was filed about two weeks before the merits hearing.  To the extent that 
Dacres merely challenges the IJ’s discretionary decision to deny a continuance, we lack 
jurisdiction over that challenge.  See Rachak v. Att’y Gen., 734 F.3d 214, 216-17 (3d Cir. 
2013).  However, to the extent that his claim could be construed as alleging that the 
denial of a continuance violated his due process rights, we have jurisdiction to review 
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that claim.  See Hoxha v. Holder, 559 F.3d 157, 163 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009).  Nevertheless, as 
explained below, this due process claim lacks merit.    
 In his appeal to the BIA, Dacres argued that the denial of a continuance prevented 
him from enlisting the help of an expert witness.  In considering this claim, the BIA noted 
that Dacres “had previously requested and was granted several continuances to seek 
counsel and investigate his relief.”  (A.R. at 6.)  The BIA further noted that Dacres “ha[d] 
not submitted an expert witness report or sufficiently explained how a report may have 
altered the outcome of the [IJ’s] decision.”  (Id.)  As a result, the BIA concluded that the 
IJ’s denial of a continuance did not violate Dacres’s due process rights.  We find no error 
in the BIA’s decision.  See Khan v. Att’y Gen., 448 F.3d 226, 236 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating 
that “[d]ue process challenges to deportation proceedings require an initial showing of 
substantial prejudice”) (alteration in original, quotation marks omitted). 
 In light of the above, we will dismiss Dacres’s petition for review in part and deny 
it in part.2  
                                              
2 The Government states that Dacres was removed from the United States on January 29, 
2015.  At that time, Dacres had a motion for a stay of removal pending before this Court.  
Despite the pendency of that stay motion, the Government informed us only after he had 
been removed.  It has not explained why he was removed while his stay motion was 
pending.  Although the Government’s actions in this case do not affect the disposition of 
Dacres’s petition for review, we are nevertheless troubled by them, and we write here to 
stress our opposition to the removal of an alien before we have had the opportunity to 
consider his or her stay motion.       
